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I remember our lecturer of philosophy of law telling us in our 
first year, that " ... law goes no further than the word itself." Thus having 
been imbued with Kelsenian positivism, we constantly find ourselves 
between harsh social reality and legal codifications which have remained 
unaffected by social change. This means that, by adhering to the positivist 
school of thought, the most human of natural sciences is ethically stripped 
of its human content. This is what one may call the cult of "the pure theory 
of Law" 1 so vehemently denounced by the German philosopher G. 
Radbruch after the Second World War. Positivism acquires particular 
importance when coupled with the other belief that "ubi societas ibi ius". 
This may be termed as the philosophy of "essentiality", in that we are made 
to believe that the existence of a normative order is a "sine qua non" for the 
preservation of an ordered society. However, we tend to confound the word 
"society" with the other word "state". What we must understand is that 
the present form of the law emerged with the creation of the modern state. 
If we regard the state "as old as man himself", society is older still and the 
present form of law was not a natural consequence of society but a political 
appendage to state mechanism. Indeed one may affirm that the present 
systems of law are relatively recent phenomena in the history of political 
thought. The logical outcome has been that, in the mind of students, law 
has become synonymous with the state. Law, instead of being viewed as the 
product of a living society, is still conisdered to be the will of the state 
("quod principis plaquit legem habeat vigorem").2 
Considering the present "cadre" of legal philosophy in Malta, it 
becomes very difficult to talk of what Marxism has to say about law. 
Indeed, writing about this subject in our country is treading on thorny 
ground due to the accumulation of preconceived ideas against Marxism 
throughout the years. Marxism tends to be associated with an iconoclastic 
creed which underrates the importance of law in society. 
To put it succinctly, what Marxism talks about is Change, a 
word which carries "revolutionary" implications for those who have 
comfortably consolidated their positions in society and are happy with the 
present state of affairs. Life being dynamic, all things are in a state of 
metamorphosis. To borrow the Heraclitean axiom, the Marxist belief that 
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1. For example, we were once told in purely Kelsenian language that section 66 of the 
Maltese Constitution constitutes the "grundnorm" of the Maltese legal system. 
2. See a very interesting article by N. Bobbio in the "American Journal of 
Comparative Law" No.3, 1959 p.332. 
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human relations in society are constantly in a state of flux, inevitably leads 
to the result that socio-political institutions, which have their roots in socio-
economic factors (these being the sum total of human relations within a 
particular system of production) are equally in a state of flux. Therefore, a 
legal system, being such an institution, necessarily changes with the flowing 
magma of human relations underlying it.3 
In the history of philosophy of law Marx acquires a marked 
importance for several reasons. The first lies in the chronological fact that 
he appeared on the scene at a time when after the total philosophy of Hegel, 
the young Hegelians of the time were in much the same position as the 
Greeks after Aristotle. What is more, he arrived at a very ripe moment 
which enabled him to absorb the flow of three major sources of human 
understanding, these mainly being, English classical philosophy, French 
socialism and German classical philosophy. All three sources led Marx to 
recognise that '' ... legal regulations as well as forms of state are to be 
understood neither in themselves nor from the so-called general develop-
ment of the human mind, but rather have their roots in the material 
conditions of life ... ". 4 
Marx broke away from the contemporary philosophical tradition 
in two major respects. From the time of the pre-socratic philosophers up to 
the time of the "total philosophy" of Hegel, only the Greek atomists had 
endeavoured to explain the real, material essence of life, albeit from a 
physical perspective. More than trying to answer the question of "What is 
the purpose of things?" they tried to answer the other more important 
question: "What causes things to come into being?" In other words, the 
atomists, unlike Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, sought to understand the 
world without introducing the notion of purpose, that is, without trying to 
give a theological explanation.5 It was only with the advent of Marx that 
interest was again kindled in the philosophy of the cause of things rather 
than in their purpose. His theory of historical materialism, which I purport 
to discuss later on, aims at providing us, not with an explanation of why 
socio-political institutions exist but rather with an insight into what causes 
them and how they come into being. 
Secondly, Marx managed to detach himself irom the German 
idealist philosophy of his time. In Marx's opinion, all inherited conceptions 
of law represent idealist embellishments of existing conditions, and in order 
to edify them, one is forced to reject that deep sense of social justice. 6 It is 
for this reason that Marx, even from his student days, always strove to 
explain the law as a reflection of actual reality. He always considered law, 
not as a being in itself, (i.e. a closed universe of norms) but as a system 
highly sensitive to the socio-economic changes within the bosom of society 
3. Marx's attachment to movement and change had always been manifest in him. In 
1839 he chose as a subject for his doctoral thesis the epicurean and democritean philosophy of 
atomism -David Mcllelan: "Karl Mars - His Life and Thought". Paladin. p.38. 
4. Karl Marx "Preface To A Critique Of Political Economy". MESW.1 .362. 
5. Bertrand Russel: "History Of Western Philosophy". Unwin Paperbacks p.84. 
6. Paul Philips: "Marx And Engels On Law And Laws" . p.5. 
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as a whole. Law cannot be considered independent from that which gives it 
meaning and existence. In purely Marxist language this is known as the 
fetishism 7 of law. Law was no longer the fruit of the Kantian "a priori'' nor 
the Hegelian "Idea" or "Spirit" outside man (though in earlier stages of his 
life he had once contended both views). Nor did he find the essence of laws 
in past history of people (Volksgeist) as the Historical school, headed by 
Von Savigny, contended. Marx's main interest was in the struggle of man 
bound together against nature, in the first instance, with the economics of 
society, which according to him, revealed the "anatomy of society", at least 
of the modern European society under a capitalist system of production. 
Marx's rejection of German idealist philosophy brings us to the 
discussion of the theory of historical materialism. As a socio-economic 
concept, the theory of historical materialism tries to give an explanation of 
how social systems work and what causes social transformations. 
7. In his social theory Marx used the word fetish in a late 18th century sense that was 
derived from the early anthropological study of Charles De Brosses. A fetish was an inanimate 
object worshipped because of its alleged magical powers. Marx adopts this concept to the 
nature of commodities under a capitalist mode of production. Thus, Marx argued that the 
fetish character of commodities is derived from the peculiar social character of the labour 
which produces it. His view was that useful objects become commodities only because they are 
products of private labours carried on independently of one another, rather than labours 
carried on in a consciuosly social fashion by means of a plan. In a capitalist, commodity-
producing society, in Marx's view, relations based on the exchange value of commodities (or 
social relations of things) came to control the distribution of labour products and the 
distribution of labourers themselves within the production process. Since, according to Marx, 
producers and their products are manipulated by the workings of a fetish (the commodity), socio-
economic relations in a capitalist society are and appear to be, material relations between 
persons and social relations between things, though this does not in itself constitute a full 
understanding of the situation. Now the question arises of how this concept of fetishism is 
connected with law. 
Marx and Engels did not expressly make a direct link, but they often hit upon themes 
containing similar arguments (eg. Karl Marx "The Trial Of The Rhineland District Committee 
Of Democrats" or in "The Revolutions of 1848"). Some Marxists have, however, explicitly 
used the term fetishism to refer to attitudes towards the legal form. Whenever law is raised to 
the position of being the foundation stone of social transformation, or being the cause of social 
transformation, marxists perceive the fetishism of law at work. The fetishism of law is the 
converse belief that law is vital. This fetishism arises because of the manner in which law 
touches upon every aspect of social life. It defines, analyses and regulates all manners of 
relations, and ordinary citizens learn to interpret social phenomena according to legal 
categories. Yet, the key point to historical materialism is, that the law is not basic to social 
structures and that to believe that all these social relations are created and depend on law is to 
mistake the appearance of legal omnicompitence for the reality of material determinism. As 
the most authoritative Marxist scholar on the subject put it "social relations are not 
commanded by Law" (Pasukanis E.B. "Law and Marxism: A General Theory". chap.111). 
Pashukanis contended that because the relation between debtor and· creditor is generally only 
understood within a legal framework, this suggests that law is the basis of social life and 
commercial intercourse. According to Marxism however the legal relation is determined by 
deeper elements in the social formation. - See further an interesting study on this problem 
written by Balbus l.D. "Commodity Form And Legal Form" in "Reasons". See also C.E. and 
Rich R.M. "The Sociology Of Law" (Butterworths. Toronto, 1978) esp. pp.83 - 85. 
8. In the "Preface" to "A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy" 
Marx writes: "I was taking up law, which discipline, however, I only pursued as a subordinate 
subject along with philosophy and history." MESW.1.361. 
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We may commence by stating that when one studies the 
evolution of human societies, the role of conscious action in the 
determination of events presents a central theoretical problem. Thus our 
query hinges on the answer to the question of whether we are free to 
determine and create our own history or whether we are conditioned by our 
environment from early stages of existence to follow evolutionary patterns. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to ask the following question: How far 
is the feeling of choice inherent in human existence when participating in 
historical events? 
It is possible to make a general division of social theories into 
those that attribute to the human mind the capability of overcoming all 
circumstances of existence in such a manner as to determine the course of 
history and those other theories which consider human action under the 
light of specific modes of social activity, determined by external factors. 
The first of these approaches may be termed as ''idealism'' while the second 
may be called ''materialism''. 
In the history of social thought seldom do we come across a 
theorist who remained blindly faithful to one extreme or another. Marx was 
no exception. Though it is true to say that in formulating the theory of 
historical materialism he rejected the philosophy of the German idealist 
philosophers of his time, he nonetheless reinained unaffected by a total 
endorsement of materialism.9 However, when it comes to interpret his 
ideas, the crux of the problem lies in the attempt to find how he endeavoured 
to reconcile a fundamental orientation towards materialism while at the 
same time admitting a margin of freedom to the individual by consciously 
acting to change and transform the environment and consequently society. 
The problem acquires particular importance and significance in 
the analysis of law, for legal institutions and rules are constantly considered 
to be the fruits of purposive human actions. In modern society where the 
predominant form of law is a complex regulatory code, this purposive, 
artificial aspect of the law is particularly manifest. It is precisely here, that 
the theory of historical materialism makes its major contribution. It 
provides us with the scientific explanation of how these consciously created 
laws are in the last analysis conditioned and determined by material 
circumstances. 
9. It should be observed that Marx seldom referred to himself as materialist. In the 
Thesis On Feuerbach he alluded, in any case, to his presupposition as a "new" materialism, to 
be distinguished from materialism as previously understood. Traditionally materialism is the 
philosophical doctrine that reality is ultimately material and so it follows that immaterial 
phenomena do not exist (for example, God) or are manifestations of some essentially material 
process which we do not as yet understand fully (for example thought). Marx rejected this, not 
because he could claim to refute it, but because it posed questions irrelevant to his 
investigations of social phenomena. So when he claimed to be a new materialist we can from 
his comment infer two things: (a) he was not an idealist who takes the ultimate constituent of 
realtiy to be ideas, thought, mind, or something similar and (b) that to be a materialist on the 
Marxian model one need only make his triune supposition i.e. individuals, their activities and 
material conditions. 
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In this sense economic relations acquire vital importance for the 
proper interpretation of law from a Marxist perspective. Indeed law is 
presented as dependent upon the level of economic development or form of 
property relations. Law is "the official recognition of facts" . 10 Here Marx 
rejects the speculative philosophy of German idealism and makes his own 
the transformative method of Ludwig Feuerbach. He reverses the "nature" 
of things and Man no longer remains the predicate of his studies but is 
reinstituted as the subject. In other words, he uses philosophy to transform 
the world rather than to interpret it. II In the eyes of Marx, therefore, law is 
no longer conceived as an autonomous principle playing a causal role in the 
historical process, as some still want us to believe up to this day. On the 
contrary it is specifically against this tradition that Marx stresses that 
"revolutions are not made by law." 12 
The theory of historical materialism is not uniformally endorsed 
by all Marxists. Various interpretations have been advanced as to what this 
theory imports. Orthodoxy, as in other branches of thought, has claimed 
those who have embraced this theory without reservations. Others, unable 
to receive it in its unrevised form, have given it a pliable interpretation in 
accordance with the exigencies of modern society .13 In spite of this lack of 
uniformity among Marxist scholars, there is one work which has been 
considered as definitive. This is Marx's "Preface" to an essay entitled "A 
Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy" . 14 
Given the close relationship between the relations of production 
and the material world, Marx suggests in the "Preface", that all social 
institutions of a community, including its structures of political authority 
and its laws, arise from and adapt themselves to the nature of relations of 
production. Thus, laws are determined in their form and content by the 
relations of production, that is to say by the material base or what is 
interchangeably called the substratum. Indeed if a conflict develops 
between the political and legal superstructure and the requirements of the 
relations of production, i.e. the substratum, then severe dislocation will 
result which calls for a change in the latter. 15 
10. Karl Marx: "The Poverty Of Philosophy". MECW.VI.50. 
11. See Marx's "Thesis on Feuerbach". 
12. Karl Marx "Kapital". Vol.1.p.750. 
13. The author of this article adheres to the latter school of thought. 
14. Karl Marx: "Preface To A Contribution To The Critique Of Political Economy". 
In "Early Writings" . ed. L.Colletti. (Peguin NLR, 1975) p.424. 
15 . The traditional Marxist school conceive the economic relations as the sub-
structure and the legal institutions as the superstructure. Sub-structure (base) and 
superstructure are metaphors borrowed from architecture. It is obvious that they only serve to 
illustrate the connection, not to define it in exact terms. This superstructure, according to 
Marx's well-known formula (vide "Preface"), comprises not only law but also ethics and 
culture. See Karl Renner "The Institutions Of Private Law And Their Social Functions". Ed. 
0. Khan-Freund (Routeledge & Keegan Paul 1949. repr 1976) pp.106-108. See for a valuable 
general discussion of base superstructure Williams. R. (1973) "Base And Superstructure" New 
Left Review 82 3 - 16; Hall S. "Rethinking The 'Base And Superstructure' Metaphor" in 
"Class, Hegemony And Party" ed. Bloomfield J. (Lawrence and Wishart London). 
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In its pure form, the theory of historical materialism argues that 
legal phenomena are essentially superstructural, in that they are determined 
by the economic basis of society. This metaphor of base and superstructure 
has usually been taken as "il punto di partenza" in explaining the nature of 
law from a Marxist perspective. We come across this metaphor for the first 
time in the "Preface", wherein it is said that the economic structure or base 
constitutes "the foundation on which rises a legal and political super-
structure". In this and other passages therefore, the superstructure is 
conceived as an "expression" or a "reflection" of the material base. 
How is one to proceed so that we may distinguish between the 
substratum and those rules which are essentially superstructural? By what 
method is one to determine that certain rules are superstructural ''sic et 
simpliciter"? In recent years the distinction between the two has been 
bridged by critics of Marxist philosophy. 16 What is more, Marxists 
themselves have noticeably modified their enthusiasm for a strict adherence 
to the base and superstructure model. 17 
The theory of historical materialism suggests that law or rather, 
a system of law, besides being an instrument of class oppression, also 
provides the rules by which the relations of production are constituted. For 
instance in a society of hunters, one may identify the relations of production 
as those arrangements set up for the trapping of prey and the distributing of 
food. Let us suppose that this arrangement is substantiated by a 
conventional rule which requires every able-bodied man to participate in the 
hunt. In order to obtain the respect of the members of the tribe to such a 
rule, it may be enforced or implemented by means of sanctions such as 
ostracism, removal of privileges etc. A question to be asked is whether this 
rule forms part of the relations of production or whether it is super-
structural in form . 
Looking at the rule from a practical angle, it seems to be a 
constituent part of the arrangement, and as such cannot be detached from 
the relations of production by simply regarding it as superstructural. 
Without such a rule or custom, food supplies would be endangered by a 
small group of men reluctant to participate in the hunt. This rule, therefore, 
appears to be at the heart of the productive process since it is an essential 
ingredient of the relations of production. Yet, looking at this rule from the 
social angle, it is closely analogous to law or morality, which according to 
the theory of historical materialism, is located within the superstructure. 
This shows that in practice, it becomes difficult to maintain a net distinction 
between base and superstructure unless it is insisted that such rules are 
incorporated in the superstructure. 
16. See Acton H.B. "The Illusion Of The Epoch - Marxism-Lennism as a 
Philosophical Creed''. (Cohen and West Ltd. London 1955) at pp. 137, 164 - 168, 172- 179, 
and 270. See also Popper K.R. "The Open Society And Its Enemies" Vol.I I (London 1952). 
17. Williams R. "Marxism And Literature" pp.75-82; Cain M. and Allen Hunt 
"Marx And Engels On Law". Law, State and Society Series (Academic Press 1979) pp.48 - 51. 
See also Thompson E.P. "The Poverty of Theory" (Merlin Press London 1978) p.288. 
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The problem of defining the relations of production becomes 
more complicated in a technologically advanced society. For instance, in a 
society such as ours, based on the exchange of commodities, it is virtually 
impossible to make an analysis of the relations of production without 
falling on the basic legal framework of contracts and the protection of 
private ownership afforded both by civil and criminal law. Consequently 
though the Maltese Civil Code is part of the Maltese legal system, and as 
such may be generally described as superstructural, particular sections 
regulating the law of contract play an important rol.e in the material base. 
Similarly those wanting to acquire the ownership of a thing are encouraged 
to do so in the Civil Code section 357 of Civil Code which gives the right to 
dispose of the thing duly acquired by any of the modes foreseen by the law 
in the most absolute manner. This means that the proprietary rights 
emanating from the general right of ownership, contain within themselves, 
before anything else, an economic significance for the holder of that right. 
Nor would the crucial process of extraction of surplus value from labour 
occur were it not for a reliable framework of rules similar to the contract of 
employment. Again therefore, there is the problem of defining the relations 
of production so that they do not include significant elements of the super-
structure. To this extent it is impossible to maintain that the material base 
determines the form and content of the legal superstructure when the 
material base itself is composed of law. 18 
In order to steer ourselves out of this antinomy, we may resort 
to the distinction between law and other kinds of normative or semi-
normative rules. Innumerable norms exist within a particular society under 
the form of customs, morals, rules of etiquette and law. Sense can be made 
out of the base/superstructure metaphor by arguing that only those norms 
which have not as yet crystallised into legal rules, form the relations of 
production. These may be termed as informal customary rules in contrast to 
legal or formally recognised rules. The crystallisation of informal 
customary rules begins by some social force challenging them. This 
challenge may consist in a controversial issue or when any behaviour which 
tends to depart from their dictates is either energetically defended or 
suppressed. This in turn, creates a disputable area, the confines or legal 
existence of which are determined or resolved, by some authoritive body, 
such as a court of law, or until it is officially recognised as a legal rule by an 
act of Parliament. Either the ruling of the Court or the act of Parliament 
will lay down definitively the standard of behaviour required. It is the 
"iter" through which informal customary rules are transformed into 
formal legal norms. Thus tension in the relations of production transfer 
these informal customary rules through the mechanism of state from the 
material base to the superstructure. 
It is imperative to recall that Marxism regards values, beliefs 
and motivations for conscious action as the outcome of practical activity. 
18. Plamenatz J. "Man And Society". Vol.I p.282. 
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As such, law is bound to be inspired by the dominant ideologies which 
emerge from social practices occurring in the mode of production. Legal 
regulation inevitably coincides with such norms of behaviour as it is merely 
a more precise and positive articulation of the requirements of the dominant 
ideology. 
From the moment at which formal legal rules come into 
existence, they absorb within them all those prevailing customs with which 
they coincide. To this extent, law is a metanormative process because it 
overlays and engulfs existing standards of conduct which may have 
appeared within the relations of production. In this sense this interpretation 
fares well with Marxism, for while it does not deny that legal rule<i are 
superstructural, it also admits that law possesses metanormative qualities. 
This puts us in -the position of locating legal rules in the relations of 
production, even though in the last analysis, they are institutionally 
speaking, superstructural. 
It would seem that the theory of historical materialism states the 
obvious: law changes with society. However obvious this observation may 
seem to be, Western legal philosophy has always been alien, save for some 
insignificant exceptions, to what one may label as "the philosophy of 
change". Marxism in its purest form, emphasises that the objective 
conditioning of law by the economic base by no means rules out the 
voluntary conscious participation of people as a vital constituent element in 
elaborating and developing the law. Law, although particularly influenced 
by the economy of a society, nonetheless remains the product of collective 
and conscious activity . 19 This is what "the withering away of the law" 
implies. 20 Law, as it stands at present times, will wither away in the sense 
that by a continuous process of evolutive change (which may consist in a 
revolutionary movement as was the case in the French Revolution), it will in 
the future metamorphosise into an altogether different normative order. 
19. In a letter to J. Bloch Engels writes: "According to the materialist conception of 
history, the ultimately determining factor in history is the production and reproduction of real 
life. Neither Marx nor I have ever asserted more than this. Hence if somebody twists this into 
saying that the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition 
into a meaningless, abstract, phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various 
elements of the superstructure - political forms of the class struggle and its results, such as 
constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle etc, juridical forms, 
and especially the reflections of all these real strugles in the brains of the participants, political, 
legal, philosophical theories, religious views and their further development into dogmas - also 
exercise their influence upon the course of historical struggles and in many cases determine 
their form in particular. There is an interaction in all these elements in which, amid the endless 
host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so 
impossible of proof that we can regard it as nonexistant and neglect it.), the economic 
movement is finally bound to assert itself. Otherwise the application of the theory to any 
period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree." 
MESC,394-395. 
20. Two misconceptions must be cleared. (i) Whenever western writers on the subject 
of law accuse marxism of underrating law, they present a very ~ubjective conception of law, so 
that its withering away appears to be the abolition of human rights and their legal guarantees. 
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Law is subject to the dialectical rules of life as much as humanity and its 
activity are. No person can be accused of legal nihilism for believing in the 
predicament that "law will wither away" in the same manner that a person 
cannot be accused of misanthropy for stating that man is mortal. "Society 
does not depend on law." This is a legal fiction. The law rather depends on 
society ... As soon as the code ceases to correspond to social relations, it is 
no more than a bundle of paper. Social relations cannot make old laws the 
foundation of the new development of society, nor could these laws have 
the old social circumstances. These laws emerged from those old 
circumstances and must perish with them. They must alter in line with the 
changes in the conditions of life. The defence of old laws against the new 
needs and claims of social development is fundamentally nothing but a 
hypocritical defence of outdated particular interest against the 
contemporary interest of the whole. 21 You may resist a change in the law 
and prolong the life of old ones, but change will come. This is an inevitable 
outcome. 
However, they fail to explain or at times consciously disregard the fact , that when speaking 
about the withering away of the law, Marxism has in mind least of all any annulling of man's 
rights and freedoms, but rather the ending of State compulsion as the specific feature of the 
law. (ii) What is more many attribute this phrase to Marx's writings, when in reality Marx 
always refrained from mentioning either the withering away of the State and least of all of the 
law. The origin of the phrase "withering away" is found in a tract written by Engels entitled 
"Anti-Duhring" . And even here, Engels speaks only of the withering away of the State and not 
of law. I. Lenin was the first to subscribe explicitly to the thesis that the law will wither away. 
In his "The State And The Revolution" he understood Engels to say, that if the State will 
wither away law will necessarily also wither away. 
21. Articles from the "Neue Rhenisch Zeitung" pp.227-247. See also Mehering K. 
"Karl Marx: The story of his life". (Allen and U.iwin London) p.183. 
